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Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance 
 
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl1 
 
October 3, 2013 
 
 
Abstract. Shareholder voting is a weak and much-criticized mechanism for controlling 
managerial opportunism. Among other problems, shareholders are often too uninformed 
to vote wisely, and majority and supermajority rule permits large shareholders to exploit 
small shareholders. We propose a new voting system called Quadratic Voting(QV), 
according to which shareholders are not given voting rights but may purchase votes, with 
the price of votes being a quadratic function of the number of votes purchased. QV 
ensures that voting outcomes are efficient under reasonable conditions. We argue that 
corporations should implement QV, or a simple approximation called square-root voting, 
and that the law permits them to do so. Certain legal protections for shareholders, such as 
the appraisal remedy and poison pill, are unnecessary if QV is implemented. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Since Berle and Means’ classic book of 1932,2 the agency costs of corporate governance 
have played a central role in discussions about corporate law. Berle and Means observed that in 
the modern publicly held corporation, shareholders cannot realistically control managers, which 
means that managers can take a range of actions that transfer the corporation’s wealth to 
themselves rather than to the shareholders. In modern terms, corporations are beset with agency 
problems. Large portions of corporate law can be understood as an attempt to minimize agency 
costs. 
 
 The central problem is that the managers of the corporation exercise control over its 
activities, and have inside information about which activities are profitable and which are not. 
Large corporations have thousands or millions of shareholders because shareholders seek to 
diversify their holdings, and so avoid buying all or nearly all of a firm’s shares. But by the same 
token, shareholders lack information about the workings of a corporation, and thus have trouble 
judging the managers’ decisions. As a result, managers can take actions that fail to maximize the 
value of the corporation and instead transfer value to the managers themselves.3 
 
 Examples of such managerial opportunism are well known. At the extreme, managers can 
simply expropriate some of the firm’s assets. This is unusual in advanced countries, but 
managers can accomplish the same goal sub rosa by overpaying themselves, diverting corporate 
                                                
1 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Assistant Professor in the 
Department of Economics and the College, University of Chicago. Thanks to Todd Henderson and conference 
participants for comments, and Ellie Norton for research assistance. 
2 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 1932). 
3 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J Fin 737 (1997) for a valuable 
but somewhat dated survey. For recent discussions, see, for example, Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance 
(Princeton 2005). 
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opportunities to independent entities that they control, overinvesting in perquisites like fancy 
office suites, building empires so as to enhance their sense of importance, and so on. Some 
commentators have blamed the financial crisis of 2007-2008 on poor corporate governance at 
major financial institutions.4 
 
 There are two direct mechanisms for controlling managers. First, shareholders enjoy 
voting rights with respect to major actions like mergers, elections of members of the board of 
directors, amendments to corporate charters, and stock issuances. Second, the law provides 
remedies when managers engage in the worst forms of self-dealing, like appropriating assets. 
Managers are also, of course, indirectly constrained by other factors, such as product market 
competition and the threat of takeover. 
 
 Our focus is on the voting system. The idea behind voting is that if shareholders can 
exercise the vote, they can block transactions that do not maximize shareholder value. But there 
is also an obvious problem with shareholder voting. A voter (or coalition of voters) with a 
majority of shares (and hence votes) can outvote the minority, and so cause the corporation to 
make decisions that transfer value from minority to majority, including decisions that do not 
maximize firm value. Since investors can anticipate such majority opportunism, they will pay 
less for equity than they otherwise would.  
 
 We propose a superior form of corporate voting known as Quadratic Voting(QV), which 
is based on theoretical work by Glen Weyl.5 Under QV, shareholders do not obtain voting rights 
along with their shares. Instead, everyone interested in a corporate outcome that is subject to a 
vote may buy as many votes as he wants for the purpose of casting them in that particular 
election. The price of the votes is a quadratic function of the number of votes purchased. For 
example, one can buy one vote for $1, two votes for $4, and three votes for $9. One can also buy 
fractions of votes, again for the square of the fraction. The proposal subject to the vote is 
approved if the number of votes in favor exceeds the number of votes against. The money 
collected from the voters is transferred to the corporate treasury, and thus ultimately distributed 
to the shareholders, except that large shareholders (with more than 1% of stock) would only 
receive back 1% of the money collected from the votes they personally buy. Any excess thus 
generated would be distributed pro rata by shares directly to the rest of the shareholders. The 
voting process is confidential and collusive arrangements and side payments would be illegal and 
subject to enforcement under antitrust law. 
 
 Under reasonable conditions, QV guarantees an efficient outcome, which reduces agency 
costs by preventing managers from implementing major decisions that benefit them at the 
expense of the firm, and preventing large shareholders from directing the corporation to enrich 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. There are also a number of positive second-
order effects. QV increases the value of corporate votes, so that more will be held; and this 
further constrains managers and large shareholders, reducing agency costs. QV may improve the 
                                                
4 See, for example, David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, and Pedro Matos, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 
Financial Crisis, 18 J Corp Fin 389 (2012); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 Iowa J Corp L 265 (2012).  
5 E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (University of Chicago Working Paper, Apr 1, 2013), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003531 (visited May 3, 2013). 
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incentive of investors to gather information about firms and to vote. Finally, as we will discuss, 
QV may render unnecessary certain legal protections of shareholders, such as the appraisal 
remedy and poison pills, which scholars have long regarded as costly and imperfect. For all these 
reasons, QV should lower the cost of capital. 
 
 
I. Quadratic Voting 
 
Most groups make collective decisions about public goods by some form of one-person-
one-vote democracy, or one-share-one-vote in the corporate case. This contrasts sharply with the 
systems modern economies use to allocate private goods, where those who care more about a 
good receive more of it. Because typical majority-rule voting systems in democracies do not 
allow individuals to express intensities of preference, they are not efficient in creating public 
goods in the way that the market is efficient in allocating private goods. As a result, economists 
have proposed alternative social choice “mechanisms” that incorporate intensity of preference 
and provide individuals with an incentive to optimally disclose their true intensity of preference. 
Unfortunately, these mechanisms have thus far suffered from various severe defects that make 
them impractical. For example, the most canonical of these mechanisms, that proposed by 
Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves,6 can be turned to the purposes of any two individuals who collude 
in their participation in the mechanism or any one individual who can manufacture a second, 
false identity.7 
 
 QV, as described above, avoids these difficulties while allowing intensity of preference to 
be expressed. To see why this rule incorporates the true intensity of individuals’ preferences, 
consider two different individuals. The first individual has a net value for building a bridge of 
$1000; that is, she would be willing to pay $1000 to see the bridge built. The second individual 
opposes construction of the bridge and is willing to pay $500 to avoid the taxes its building will 
impose on him. Both individuals think that the vote on the bridge is likely to be close enough so 
that each vote they purchase moves the chance that the bridge is built or not in their desired 
direction by 1%. Because both are rational and neither has a very large impact on the decision, 
they share the same value of this estimate and it is independent of the number of votes they buy 
so long as this number is not too large. 
 
 How many votes will the first individual buy in favor of the bridge being built? Each vote 
gains her a value of . 01 ∗ $1000 = $10. If she buys only one vote, she spends $1 and receives a 
benefit of $10. If she buys 2 votes, she spends $4, and so for a marginal cost of $3 ($4-$1), she 
gains another $10. What about 3 votes? Three votes cost her another $5 ($9-$4), still less than 
the marginal gain of $10. If she buys 4 votes, she pays $16, while if she buys five votes she pays 
$25, so it is better for her to buy 5 votes rather than 4— because the cost of the additional voting 
power ($9) is less than the gain ($10). If she buys 6 votes she pays $36, $11 more than if she 
buys 5 votes, but only gains $10 in value from doing so. Thus she won’t buy the sixth vote. 
                                                
6 William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J Fin 8 (1961); Edward H. 
Clark, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 Pub Choice 17 (1971); Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 
Econometrica 617 (1973). 
7 Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction, in Peter Cramton, Yoav 
Shoham, and Richard Steinberg ,eds, Combinatorial Auctions (MIT 2006). 
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Using a little bit of calculus we can solve for her optimal number of votes 𝑣. The value she gains, 
in dollars, from buying votes is 10𝑣 while the amount she loses from the cost of votes is 𝑣!. 
Setting her marginal cost equal to her marginal benefit of buying votes, her optimal number of 
votes is 10 = 2𝑣 or 𝑣∗ = 5. So she should buy exactly 5 votes.  
 
 On the other hand, the individual who is willing to pay $500 to avoid the bridge being 
built will buy negative votes (votes against the bridge). His utility from votes is −5𝑣 − 𝑣!. By 
the same logic, he will optimally buy 𝑣∗ = −2.5. More generally, an individual with utility 𝑢 
from the bridge buys votes 𝑣∗(𝑢) = .!"∗!! , because the chance that she changes the outcome is . 01. The decision is made based on total votes, which are the same as the total value of  .!"! 𝑢. 
But this is positive if and only if the sum of everyone’s utilities is as well. That is, the system 
will make a decision in favor of whichever outcome (building or not building the bridge) 
maximizes the total utility because everyone buys votes in proportion to the intensity of their 
preference. QV is thus efficient, as long as the approximating assumptions we used above hold.  
 
 In particular, Weyl shows that as long as the distribution of preferences is commonly 
known and some technical assumptions are satisfied, the probability that the decision is made 
incorrectly approaches 0 as the number of voters 𝑛 grows large at rate !!  .8 If the distribution of 
preferences is not commonly known and individuals must make guesses about it based on their 
own preferences or the total number of voters is small, matters are more subtle. However, QV is 
still fully efficient under reasonable conditions, and much more efficient than voting under a 
broad range of cases.  
 
 What is so special about the quadratic rule? Why couldn’t individuals just pay 
proportional to the number of votes they buy? The key is that the quadratic rule is the only one 
under which the cost of the marginal vote is proportional to the number of votes already bought. 
If, as we assume, the marginal benefit of a vote increases at a linear rate, then the marginal cost 
of the vote must also increase at a linear rate; that is only possible if the total cost of votes 
increases by the square of the number of votes. 
 
By way of contrast, suppose that votes had a fixed linear cost of, say, $7. Then the first 
individual would be willing to buy an enormous number of votes, as each is worth $10 to her and 
the second individual would be willing to buy none. The first individual would thus act as a 
dictator, buying the whole election even if there were 10 or 100 other individuals all of whom 
would be willing to pay $500 to avoid the bridge being built.9 It is this disproportionate power 
afforded to those who are willing to pay most that makes standard linear vote buying so 
unattractive and is likely the reasons so many are opposed to corruption of politicians, “empty 
voting” for corporate governance (where individuals buy votes without having to buy shares 
using derivative contracts), and other cases where an individual can linearly buy influence in a 
                                                
8 The rate depends on the tail properties of the distribution of valuations and the result reported here is based on the 
conservative assumption of a Pareto-tail coefficient of 𝛼 = 3.  If tails of the valuation distribution are thinner than 
this, then the rate of convergence is faster. Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (cited in note 5). 
9 See Alessandra Casella, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, and Thomas R. Palfrey, Competitive Equilibrium in Markets, 120 J 
Pol Econ 593 (2012), for a formalization of this argument. 
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collective decision. As we discuss in the next subsection, this problem can be severe even if 
votes are linked to shares. 
 
 In practice, though, individuals who feel intensely about an issue will try to use their 
financial resources to influence the outcome, usually by spending on persuading the population 
to vote their way. In our democratic system, such spending is constitutionally protected.10 While 
such expenditures may have some of the decreasing returns to expenditures embodied in QV and 
thus may roughly approximate efficiency, there are many reasons to think an explicit vote-
buying scheme would work better. First, by formalizing the exactly correct rule, QV enhances 
efficiency and provides a procedure that is simpler and more reliable for participants than the 
status quo is. Just as the introduction of fiat money, accounting and formal contract law made 
informal systems of reciprocity and exchange that prevailed prior to the modern era into a 
widespread and efficient market economy, QV could turn the somewhat chaotic system of 
bidding for influence more systematically efficient. Second, expenditures on persuasion under 
the current system are largely wasted, while the revenue raised on QV would be distributed back 
to the population or spent on valuable projects. Finally, QV would discourage further 
expenditures on persuasion intended to push nearly-indifferent voters slightly one way or the 
other. Because votes are costly and the system incorporates preference intensity, persuasion 
would aim to convince everyone that a policy or candidate would increase their utility more than 
the alternative rather than just breaking indifferences for “swing” voters. 
 
 Vote buying seems to carry negative connotations, but it is crucial to notice the difference 
between QV and standard, linear vote-buying. For one thing, the buyer does not pay a particular 
voter (or shareholder) but society (or the corporation), so the payments are spread among all 
voters rather than concentrated in a few. But, more important, the quadratic formula blunts the 
impact of money and hence wealth on outcomes.  If Mitt Romney had wanted to spend nearly his 
whole personal fortune, $100 million, to win the presidential election, that would be his 
right…but he could only buy himself 10,000 votes, a substantial number but hardly enough to 
guarantee victory given that President Obama’s margin was nearly 5 million votes. And at the 
same time, the money he spent could be used to pay off the deficit, fund government programs or 
cut taxes rather than being wasted on advertisements.  
 
 An important concern with other mechanisms economists have proposed was that they 
allowed for easy and severe collusion: any two individuals willing to collude, or any individual 
passing himself off as two individuals, could get whatever outcome they wish and pay nothing. 
Collusion is also possible under QV, but is much less serious. Consider again the example of 
Mitt Romney. If he were able to collude with 99 other people, or to take on 99 other false 
identities, he could divide his $100 million into 100 groups of $1 million and purchase 100,000 
votes instead. This is much more than he would be able to do on his own. However, he would 
run into two obstacles. First, 100,000 votes still is not enough to swing many large elections. 
Second, especially if a secret ballot were enforced and fraud illegal, it would be hard to maintain 
such collusion. His collusive partners would have a strong incentive to pocket the money and not 
buy the votes and if he tried to pass himself off as 100 different people he would likely be 
caught. Thus, because under QV individuals need to collude with or pretend to be a large number 
of other individuals to make a significant difference in the amount of influence they can exert, its 
                                                
10 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). 
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sensitivity to collusion is not excessive. Weyl makes these arguments quantitatively precise and 
formal.11 We thus believe that QV’s benefits in terms of allowing individuals to express the 
intensity of their preference outweigh its costs in terms of collusion or fraud. In the corporate 
context, where contract and antitrust laws can be used to deter collusion and First Amendment 
rights to political spending are not at issue, the problem of collusion is even more limited. 
 
 
II. QV and Corporate Governance 
 
A. Corporate Voting and Its Pathologies 
 
 A publicly traded corporation is normally operated by its management, under the loose 
supervision of the board of directors. Shareholders have no say in day-to-day decisions. When a 
firm enters a “major” transaction, however, management must seek the approval of shareholders, 
and sometimes other stakeholders such as creditors. Major transactions include mergers, certain 
large sales of assets, financial transactions like stock issuance that could dilute the value of 
existing shares, and bankruptcy reorganization plans (where creditors can vote as well). We will 
focus on these types of transactions, and use a merger as our running example.12 But 
shareholders can vote in other contexts as well, including in elections of members of the board of 
directors and on amendments to the corporation’s charter. 
 
 The voting rules are largely determined in the charter, but they are subject to certain 
(relatively limited) legal requirements. Votes are cast by share, not by shareholder; a shareholder 
who owns 100 shares has 100 votes. Shareholders can thus accumulate votes by buying 
additional shares. Voting is by majority or supermajority rule. For example, approval of a merger 
requires a majority of outstanding shares in most U.S. states; various supermajority rules are 
used in some other countries.13 Minority shareholders can thus be outvoted. 
 
 The weakness of the voting rules, as well as other corporate governance mechanisms, is 
the dominant theme of the corporate government literature. Scholars focus on two basic 
problems. The first is managerial opportunism, where managers implement projects that transfer 
wealth from shareholders to managers. Such projects could include outright appropriation, 
excessive executive compensation, the diversion of corporate opportunities to managers, 
overinvestment in management perquisites, and managerial entrenchment.14 
 
                                                
11 Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (cited in note 5). 
12 A small literature discusses mechanism design for mergers and acquisitions. See, for example, Steven J. Brams & 
Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions (2013), available at  Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using 
Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 27 (1991); Alexander Gorbenko & Andrey 
Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions (2009), available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/events/seminars/capitalMarket/2010/1310_Gorbenko%20.pdf. These papers 
discuss the process that the board of directors should be required to use when soliciting bids; by contrast, our focus 
is on the process that shareholder use to constrain the board of directors when it comes time to approve the merger 
or acquisition. 
13 Reinier H. Kraakman, et al, eds, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 197–
98 (Oxford 2009). 
14 Shleifer and Vishny, 52 J Fin at 742–43 (cited in note 3). 
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 The second problem is that of tyranny of the majority, where majority shareholders use 
their voting strength to expropriate value from minority shareholders. Again, the way that 
majority shareholders use their voting power will vary. For example, they could (in principle) 
vote for outright appropriation of the shares of the minority. But more typically, they use their 
voting power in more indirect ways—for example, approving mergers and other transactions that 
benefit the majority at the expense of the minority, issuing shares that dilute minority interests, 
and so forth.15 
 
 The voting system thus addresses managerial opportunism by giving shareholders the 
power to block value-reducing transactions, but creates the problem of tyranny of the majority by 
giving the majority the power to outvote the minority. A supermajority rule can reduce but not 
eliminate the risk of value-reducing transfers from a (smaller) minority to a (larger) majority, but 
also creates the problem of hold-outs by a small group who withhold approval until paid off. 
These additional transaction costs may block efficient transactions.16 Thus, ordinary voting fails 
in its fundamental function of aggregating beliefs and preferences of diverse shareholders to 
ensure efficient corporate governance.  
  
 Even where the system works in theory, managers and majority shareholders can often 
evade the rules. For example, a corporation may avoid a vote on a merger by creating a shell 
corporation that buys the target firm.17 Or a corporation can effectively eliminate the value of 
voting in director elections by failing to provide shareholders with information about candidates 
who seek to challenge board choices. 
 
 In corporate bankruptcy, the pathologies of the voting rules are also evident. Shareholders 
cannot be trusted to vote so as to maximize firm value because they do not have residual 
ownership rights in an insolvent firm. The law gives voting rights to creditors. But different 
groups of creditors may have different interests, and so the law creates a complicated 
classification system, requiring majority (by number of class members) and supermajority (by 
amount of claims) voting by class, and approval of all classes subject to a cram-down exception. 
The bankruptcy court must also ensure that stakeholders are treated fairly and equally. There is 
very little reason to believe that these rules maximize the value of firms or treat creditors or 
anyone else fairly.18 
 
B. The QV Approach 
 
 A corporation could implement QV by amending its charter. The charter would provide 
that all shareholder voting would be conducted through QV. In particular, the charter would 
provide that whenever a board election, charter amendment, or major transaction occurs, a QV 
election would take place. Anyone—including people with no relation to the corporation—would 
have the right to participate. Note that shareholders would not vote the number of shares they 
                                                
15 Id at 758–59. 
16 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Michigan 1962). 
17 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 348–49 (Foundation 2d ed 2008). 
18 See Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 NYU L Rev 161 (1999); Philippe 
Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 Wash U L Q 849, 858 (1994). 
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own; large shareholders and small shareholders are in the same position as each other, and 
indeed in the same position as non-shareholders, who would also have the right to participate. 
The funds paid in from QV would be disbursed into the corporation’s treasury and thus would 
disproportionately benefit large shareholders and would not benefit non-shareholders. However, 
no shareholder would ever be able to receive back (implicitly or explicitly) more than 1% of the 
funds raised by the votes she bought herself. If a shareholder has a greater than 1% shareholding, 
any funds she contributes would be distributed back directly to shareholders, with 1% going to 
her and the remaining funds being directly rebated to other shareholders in proportion to their 
holdings pro rata, even if these other shareholders are themselves large. This rule prevents the 
implicit price of votes from being (more than slightly) lower for a large voter compared to a 
small voter. 
 
 QV is superior to majority- or supermajority-rule voting because it ensures ex-post 
efficient outcomes. QV blocks managerial opportunism because managerial opportunism is by 
definition inefficient. And QV minimizes the tyranny of majority shareholders by preventing 
majorities from using inefficient projects to transfer value from minorities to themselves.19 When 
the majority supports an inefficient merger, the minority will outvote it by buying a larger 
number of votes. Because the minority loses more than the majority gains, and QV guarantees 
ex-post efficiency, QV will block the transaction. When the majority gains more than the 
minority loses, the transaction will take place, but it is ex-post efficient, and the minority will be 
protected in part by its payoffs under QV. 
 
 Of course, ex-post efficiency is not the only, or even the primary, goal in designing a 
corporate charter. Instead, charter-writers seek to maximize the amount of capital raised, which 
depends on the marginal value of owning additional shares ex-ante, in anticipation of future 
decisions, rather than total efficiency ex-post, as we discuss in Appendix A. While there is no 
guarantee QV will maximize this ex-ante shareholder value, it seems unlikely any mechanism 
could, given that individuals’ incentives ex-post will always be based on how the decision affects 
their level of ex-post utility rather than their ex-ante marginal willingness-to-pay for shares. 
Normal voting, for example, seems far less likely to maximize ex-ante shareholder value, 
especially given that the inefficient manipulations by majority shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders (impossible under QV) are a sure-fire way to destroy ex-ante value of 
shares. Maximizing ex-post efficiency seems much more likely to align with ex-ante shareholder 
value than do other equally ex-post but also inefficient rules. 
 
 The most unusual feature of QV from the standpoint of corporate law is that anyone—
including non-shareholders—can vote. Thus, large shareholders have no greater voting power 
than small shareholders, and shareholders have no greater voting power than creditors, 
employees, neighbors, or even ordinary people with no relationship with the corporation. If this 
feature of QV seems puzzling, note first of all that most people in the world will not exercise 
their right to vote for the simple reason that they must pay in order to vote, and they are 
extremely unlikely to out-pay, and hence out-vote, shareholders and others who have a pecuniary 
stake in the corporation. This is especially true given the fixed transactions costs of participating 
in such a vote. Similarly, large shareholders will normally pay more to vote than small 
                                                
19 QV fails only when the population of voters is small or there is aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of 
valuations, and as noted above it outperforms voting typically in these cases. 
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shareholders will because large shareholders gain more from the outcome. Moreover, while non-
stakeholders can vote, they do not receive any money from the vote purchases of others, as that 
money goes into the corporate treasury. Finally, bear in mind that even under the current system 
non-stakeholders can vote merely by taking the (usually) financially trivial step of purchasing a 
share of stock. The distinction between corporate stakeholders and outsiders has never been very 
clear.20 
 
 The main point to keep in mind is that QV guarantees that the transaction will be ex-post 
efficient, thus maximizing the value of the corporation. In this way, QV ensures that shareholder 
value is maximized. Regular voting rules like majority and supermajority do not ensure ex-post 
efficient outcomes, and so are unlikely to have superior incentives on ex ante behavior.21 Under 
normal voting, in the absence of legal protections, outsiders with interests contrary to those of 
the firm may buy up a majority of shares and inefficiently undermine the firm. Under QV such 
behavior could only occur when it is socially efficient, which would greatly limit the scope for 
outside manipulation.  
 
 As a result of this feature, QV can be used more often than shareholder voting in the 
current system. Because QV is more accurate and robust than the current system, it would be 
reasonable to use it for transactions whose magnitude fall below the size that currently requires a 
vote. For this reason, advocates of shareholder democracy should endorse QV. 
 
 A recurrent criticism of the current system of shareholder voting is that shareholders have 
insufficient incentive to inform themselves because part of the benefit of their voting is 
externalized on other shareholders. Because they do not adequately inform themselves, they 
either do not vote or vote badly. Because of the close connection between the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism and QV, the results of Bergemann and Välimäki imply that under QV, unlike 
under standard voting, individuals have an incentive to optimally collect information that is 
relevant to their preferences and beliefs so long as these do not have spillovers to what decision 
is in the interests of others.22 Obviously in the corporate context, much information does spill 
over to others as each small shareholder captures only a small part of the value of such 
information. QV will not provide efficient incentives for information acquisition in this case. 
Nonetheless, we conjecture, though we have not tried to prove, that QV is superior to traditional 
voting along this dimension. Intuitively, under voting, one only needs enough information to 
decide which side one favors. Under QV, one has an incentive to achieve a much finer 
                                                
20 When a corporation such as a mutual or investment fund serves as a common agent for multiple principals, the 
common agent can buy votes only as one individual. This means, for example, that if the corporation seeks to cast 
10 votes, it must pay $100, rather than (say) $10 on behalf of 10 principals who each vote once for $1. This is true 
even if the funds used to purchase the votes belong to the principals rather than the agent.  If principals delegate this 
decision to the agent, they would not then be allowed to vote a second time themselves, but would be able to 
monitor the behavior of the agent.  This offers a simple means of extending QV to representative and other 
delegated situations: each individual can vote only under one identity, even when she represents many individuals.  
By monitoring their agent, these individuals forfeit the right to vote themselves.  This leads to efficiency by 
precisely the same logic that makes QV efficient more generally, so long as the agent acts in the collective interests 
of the principals, as the votes she will buy on behalf of her principals will be proportional to the sum of their 
utilities. 
21 We will discuss one possible limitation on this argument in Part D below. 
22 Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki, Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design, 70 Econometrica 
1007 (2002).  
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determination of the intensity of ones’ preference, which seems likely to increase information 
acquisition. 
 
 More generally, it is well-known that markets do not generally provide efficient 
incentives for information acquisition.  As Hirshleifer argues, information is often under-
provided because of the inability of the informed individual to appropriate the total social value 
of the information; it may also be over-provided when it is used, for example, to beat another 
individual to an arbitrage opportunity as is common in high-speed trading.  Matters are very 
similar under QV: information relevant to the overall direction of preferences of many 
individuals will be under-provided, while information about how close the election is (and thus 
how valuable votes are) will be over-provided as this information is essentially zero-sum.  Thus 
QV provides all of the benefits, and costs, of a market economy in its incentives for information 
acquisition, a set of trade-offs that, at least since Hayek, has been considered overall superior to 
those arising from democratic voting. 
 
 One might object that under QV people will refrain from buying large blocks of shares 
because they do not obtain voting advantages. People with large blocks of shares will have more 
intense preferences regarding mergers and the like, and so they will anticipate that they will 
spend more money on voting than people with small blocks of shares. But in the current system, 
the right to vote is close to worthless.23 People typically buy large blocks of shares not to obtain 
voting rights but to obtain a larger portion of the profit of a firm. QV, by guaranteeing that the 
firm will enter only ex-post efficient transactions, should increase rather than reduce the value of 
equity. Furthermore, the funds raised through the expenditures on votes are added to the value of 
the corporation, raising the value of shares. It is plausible that this additional revenue will more 
than outweigh any increased value of shares from accompanying voting rights. For example, in 
recent experimental work on a voting system closely related to QV, Goeree and Zhang show that 
the revenue raised makes the overwhelming majority of individuals, even those who end up with 
much less influence, support QV over voting in experiments.24  We discuss these results in 
greater detail in Appendix A. 
 
 Indeed, a major problem with the current system of shareholder voting is that it compels 
corporations to inefficiently bundle the right to receive dividends and the right to vote. The two 
rights need not go together, as is clear from various preferred stock arrangements where voting 
rights are severed or diluted. It is not entirely clear why the law prohibits people from selling 
their votes independently of their shares. As we discuss in Part C, the best argument for the ban 
on vote-buying is that the current legal system requires majority or supermajority voting, and it is 
easier to circumvent these rules by buying votes alone (given that shareholders without 
controlling blocks value votes very little) than by buying shares.25  A more fundamental reason is 
that linear vote buying would, as described in Section I, lead to the inefficient dictatorship of 
individuals with intense preferences. But this is precisely the problem solved by QV. 
                                                
23 Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting 
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J Corp Fin 343 (2007),  
24 Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang, Electoral Engineering: One Man, One Vote Bid (Aug 27, 2012), online at 
http://www.bm.ust.hk/ecdepts/Inefficient-Voting.pdf (visited May 3, 2013).  
25 For discussions, see Saul Levmore, Voting With Intensity, 53 Stan L Rev 111 (2000); Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S Cal L Rev 811 (2006). 
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 Another possible objection to QV is that it would allow interest groups or others to shut 
down a corporation they dislike on ideological grounds. If they can buy votes without buying 
shares, they can destroy a corporation in which they have no economic interest. The problem 
with this argument is that these outsiders would have to spend an enormous amount of money to 
buy votes, and this money would go to outvoted shareholders. The transaction is only possible if 
the social value of the firm taking account of outsider interests is less than zero. Given that it 
would be in fact cheaper under the current system for outsiders to gain control of and shut down 
a firm simply by buying a majority of shares, and we virtually never observe such transactions, 
we are skeptical of this objection. Furthermore, as we discuss in our critique of appraisal 
remedies in the next subsection, unless such a group of outsiders is very large, under QV it is 
cheaper for them to pay the value of the firm plus a small sweetener to current shareholders so 
that shareholders will vote in favor of the proposal themselves than attempt to outvote the 
outsiders directly. Such a prospect can only increase value to shareholders. Corporate by-laws 
should ensure they do so by prohibiting side-payments contingent on the vote, forcing outsiders 
to pay only shareholders (and not a large group of outsiders) to persuade them to approve their 
plans. Enforcement of such rules could fall under antitrust law. 
 
 QV is not a panacea. It is subject to the same arbitrage risks as majority and 
supermajority voting. For example, if a board wants to avoid a vote on a merger, it still retains 
the option to undertake the merger through a shell subsidiary.26 However, at a minimum, these 
arbitrage risks are no worse under QV. And if QV is a better system, then shareholders may 
resist arbitrage (for example, by barring arbitrage transactions in the charter) because they care 
more about making their preferences felt through voting than they do under the regular system.27 
 
C. Square-Root Voting 
 
 Reforms of all types, and not just reforms to corporate law, often encounter a hostile 
reception simply because they are unfamiliar, and are at variance with entrenched norms. QV 
may face a similar fate because of some of its unusual features. Even though money plays a 
significant role in shareholder voting—rich shareholders who buy more shares vote more—there 
may be some uneasiness with explicit vote-buying, as one can see from the literature and cases 
on that topic.28 Allowing non-shareholders to vote also seems unusual. And the redistribution of 
funds collected through the QV process would be novel in the corporate context. 
 
 To address these concerns, we propose as a slightly more modest alternative variant of  
QV that we will call Square-Root Voting (SRV). SRV provides simply that only shareholders 
vote, and that shareholders have the right to vote the square root of the number of shares they 
                                                
26 We have also not address how board voting would work; our focus instead has been on shareholder approval of 
transactions. Very roughly, board voting could work like this. SRV should be used to elect the directors. 
Shareholders vote in favor or against various candidates for the board and those who receive the largest net number 
of positive votes are elected to the board. Each director is then given a number of tokens equal to the number of net 
positive votes she received. The director then allocates her tokens across various QV votes over a given period of 
time. We do not have the space to defend this proposal here, and save it for future research. 
27 On the other hand, managers set on opportunism may work harder to engage in arbitrage. 
28 See below, section D. 
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own. A shareholder who owns one share gets one vote; a shareholder who owns 4 shares gets 2 
votes; a shareholder who owns 10 shares gets 3.2 votes; and so on. 
 
 SRV is formally almost identical to QV. To see why, consider the perspective of an 
investor who does not yet own any stock in Corporation X. Corporation X announces its 
intention to merge with Corporation Y. Under current law, the investor can purchase stock in X 
(or Y) and then exercise the voting rights associated with the share (or shares) of stock. Thus, the 
investor might buy the stock both because she believes that the merger will take place and that it 
will increase the value of the stock, and because she hopes to use the voting power to increase 
the probability that the merger will take place. 
 
 Under QV, the investor chooses the number of shares that she buys solely for the purpose 
of optimizing payment streams. She separately buys as many votes as is optimal for her to 
influence the outcome. Under SRV, the investor effectively buys stocks for their voting power. 
Because she can expect to resell them for the same price that she buys them for, she incurs only 
the opportunity cost of buying them. SRV ensures that this opportunity cost increases at a 
quadratic rate, and in this way resembles QV.  If the ban on “empty voting” (trading votes and 
shares separately, as discussed in the next subsection) were dropped, SRV would be even closer 
to QV, differing only in the fixed number of potential votes.29 
 
 Yet SRV differs from QV in several ways that may be important as a matter of 
symbolism political rhetoric but are of little importance substantively. Most important, under 
SRV shareholders vote as they normally do; the only difference is that their voting power 
increases at a decreasing rate as the number of votes they cast increases. This approach differs in 
degree but not in kind from voting rules established in the charters of many corporations, for 
example, through the creation of classes with different voting rights, as are used for poison pills. 
SRV also does not permit non-shareholders to vote, and does not require the collection and the 
redistribution of funds. These similarities to existing practices may make SRV more palatable to 
judges and corporate boards than is QV, at least in the short-term, and may smooth the way for 
the adoption of more explicit QV in the long-term. 
 
D. Legal Issues 
 
 As noted earlier, corporate law gives corporations a great deal of freedom to fashion 
voting systems. Although most corporations use regular majority or supermajority rule for major 
transactions like mergers, charter amendments, and board elections, there is a great deal of 
variation. For example, through a series of agreements with shareholders of Facebook, Mark 
Zuckerberg has 57.1 percent of voting control even though his economic stake in Facebook is 
only 28.4 percent.30 
 
                                                
29 This fixed supply is irrelevant as it only determines, by the laws of supply and demand, endogenously the 
multiplier in front of the quadratic term in the price of votes.  Because this multiplier is irrelevant to all of the 
properties of QV it makes no difference. 
30 Evelyn M. Rusli, Zuckerberg Takes Control, You Get $100, NY Times (Feb 8, 2012), online at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/zuckerberg-takes-control-you-get-100/ (visited May 3, 2013).  
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 A corporation could provide in its charter that shareholders would have the conventional 
right to a share of the firm’s profits, but that there would be no right to vote attached to each 
share. Instead, whenever the firm holds a vote, anyone registered as a shareholder at the time of 
the vote would have the right to participate.31 Each shareholder, regardless of how many shares 
he owns, would have the same voting power: the right to cast one vote for $1, two votes for $4, 
and so on. The payments would be made to the corporation, which would either deposit them in 
its treasury or put them in a fund, which would then be distributed pro rata to the shareholders at 
the conclusion of voting. 
 
 The major legal obstacle to QV is the somewhat qualified ban on vote-buying, but the 
law on vote-buying does not directly apply to QV. Indeed, existing law is better interpreted as 
directed at vote-selling—by shareholders—not vote-buying in the QV system, where the 
corporation, not a third party, sells the vote and the consideration is deposited in the corporate 
treasury. Thus, the traditional per se rule against vote-selling does not apply to QV on its terms. 
 
Moreover, the rationale for that per se rule was that each stockholder should be entitled to 
rely upon the independent judgment of his fellow stockholders…. The apparent rationale is that 
by requiring each shareholder to exercise his individual judgment as to all matters presented, 
“[t]he security of the small stockholders is found in the natural disposition of each stockholder to 
promote the best interests of all, in order to promote his individual interests.”32 
 
Even if this rationale were accepted, it would not provide an objection to QV, because QV in fact 
advances the interest of small shareholders much more effectively than ordinary voting (with or 
without vote-buying) does. 
 
Delaware courts now reject any per se rule against vote buying, and instead ban vote-
buying when it is fraudulent or violates a test of “intrinsic fairness.”33 Clearly, there is nothing 
fraudulent about QV. The intrinsic fairness test is rather obscure, but we also see nothing unfair 
about QV since it ensures ex-post efficiency and, as we discuss below, will usually ensure 
compensation for outvoted minorities. 
 
 A number of academics have launched a separate line of attack on vote-buying. A 
controversy erupted a few years ago over “empty voting,” where parties engage in financial 
engineering in order to separate the vote and the economic value of the share it is attached to.34 
For example, the owner of a share lends the share to an investor for a very brief period of time 
during which a corporate vote is held. The investor exercises the vote during this period but does 
not bear any economic consequences of the vote since the impact of the vote on the value of the 
firm takes place after the share is returned to the owner. An investor can also buy a share in order 
to obtain the voting right while fully hedging against any change in the value of the share. 
 
                                                
31 As we noted earlier, voting rights need not be limited to shareholders; but we suspect that in the early stages of its 
adoption, corporations are likely to confine voting rights to shareholders. 
32 Schreiber v Carney, 447 A2d 17, 24 (Del Ch 1982), quoting Cone v  Russell, 21 A 847, 849 (NJ Eq 1891). 
33 Schreiber, 447 A2d at 25–26; Crown Emak Partners v Emak, 992 A 2d 377 (Del Ch 2010). 
34 See Hu and Black, 79 S Cal L Rev 811 (cited in note 25). 
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 Traditional, linear vote-buying, whether in this form or another form, usually leads to 
inefficient outcomes.35 But these outcomes result only when vote-buying takes place in a regular 
voting system and thus, crucially, is linear. In fact, precisely the same analysis that Weyl uses to 
show the efficiency of QV36 implies that linear vote buying is inefficient. A broad class of vote 
buying rules nests democracy, dictatorship and QV all as special cases. Thus vote-buying in 
general, and QV in particular, should not be tarnished with the same brush as is linear vote-
buying and its dictatorial results. As discussed in the previous section, “empty voting” and vote 
buying combined with appropriate rules (square-root voting) leads to a fair and efficient 
outcome. 
 
 Indeed, even if QV were deemed illegal, SRV would almost certainly survive a legal 
attack. Under SRV, the shareholder does not explicitly buy votes; she merely exercise the right 
to vote that accompanies her share. The fact that she can only possesses votes equal to the square 
root of the number of shares does not, even indirectly, implicate vote-buying. 
 
 QV (or SRV) is not only lawful; it also reduces the need for corporate law that protects 
shareholders from managerial opportunism and minority shareholders from large-shareholder 
opportunism. Because QV blocks such opportunism, the protections are not necessary. 
 
 The most important such protection is the appraisal remedy. If majority shareholders 
engineer a merger that appears to offer unfair payoffs to the minority, the minority can seek 
protection in court by demanding an appraisal remedy. If it is successful, the corporation must 
pay minority shareholders the actual value of the shares, as determined by a court after a lengthy 
and complex valuation proceeding. 
 
 In a QV system, the ability to freeze out minority shareholders would be greatly 
diminished or even eliminated. There are two reasons for this. First, because QV blocks 
inefficient mergers, the majority would be unable to effect inefficient mergers in order to transfer 
value to itself. The majority would be able to engage in such opportunistic behavior only when 
the merger is efficient. Second and more important, QV is particularly unfavorable when a single 
shareholder or small group of shareholders attempt to impose their will on a majority. In 
Appendix B we show that, because of the small numbers, QV is not efficient in this case: it is 
biased against the small manipulative group! In particular, no individual or small group of 
shareholders can ever profitably succeed in outvoting other shareholders with any significant 
probability when the number of other shareholder-voters is large. Even when they do (with very 
small probability) win such a vote, the payments they make will typically fully compensate other 
shareholders for their loss. Thus, a shareholder or small group of shareholders seeking to execute 
such a plan would find it cheaper and more reliable to pay the shareholders enough of the surplus 
of such a transaction to make them want to vote for the transaction themselves. Intuitively, 
because the costs of voting are quadratic, and so the cost of casting the marginal vote increases at 
                                                
35 Levmore, 53 Stan L Rev 111 (cited in note 25) and Hu and Black, 79 S Cal L Rev 811 (cited in note 25) offer 
informal accounts; for a formal account, see Holger Spamann, Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting (Harvard 
Olin Faculty Discussion Paper No 730, Sept 2012), online at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Spamann_730.pdf (visited May 3, 2012); see also 
Robert B. Thompson and Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 Vand L Rev 29 (2009). 
36 Weyl, supra note __. 
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greater than linear rate, it is cheaper as a small group to incentivize others to vote in your favor 
than it is to attempt to outvote them yourself. This self-interest provides a far more effective 
check on opportunism than does the bureaucratic and inaccurate appraisal process. The only case 
when appraisal could do better is when information is hidden from shareholders and is revealed 
through the appraisal. 
 
 A related and promising application of QV is in the area of poison pills. In response to a 
wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, many corporations amended their bylaws so as to make it 
more difficult for outside investors to succeed in their takeover efforts. A typical poison pill 
provides that when an outside investor obtains shares above a threshold (typically, a significant 
minority), then insiders may purchase additional shares at a discount (for example, 50 percent).37 
Thus, insiders can buy up shares in order to obtain votes to oppose the takeover. Managers 
defend poison pills, claiming that takeovers frequently destroy jobs and disrupt operations. 
Shareholder activists argue that poison pills entrench management so that it does not pay for its 
mistakes by losing control of the corporation. 
 
 Poison pills are controversial but generally lawful in the United States, although not in all 
countries, and even in the United States, they can be challenged under general principles of 
corporate law. Now consider a poison pill that incorporates QV or SRV. A corporation could 
amend its bylaws to provide that any hostile takeover be subject to a vote under SRV. SRV does 
away with the threshold requirement (which is arbitrary) and replaces the simple discount rule 
with the more fine-grained quadratic function, which effectively makes it cheap for dispersed 
shareholders to vote for or against the merger but costly for large shareholders including 
management to oppose it. Since SRV guarantees ex post efficient results, it should ensure that 
takeovers are approved only when they are efficient. Poison pills should be lawful and immune 
to challenge as long as they comply with these principles.38 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 QV holds great promise as a mechanism for eliciting people’s private valuations. It is 
well-suited to the corporate context, which lacks the norm of one-person-one-vote and where law 
and tradition permit people to use money to signal the intensity of their interests in managerial 
decisions. As with any innovation, QV merits experimentation prior to widespread adoption to 
help reveal potential weaknesses that eluded our analysis given the novelty of QV compared to 
the many centuries of experience with voting. The flexibility of corporate charter law allows for 
such small-scale experimentation by innovative, early-adopting firms that could then be studied 
by others and, if successful, spread. In the longer term, if such experimentation is successful we 
believe that QV could be useful in other settings. Kominers and Weyl advocate its use as an 
                                                
37 See News Corp.’s poison pill. See []. 
38 For a brief argument along these lines, see Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, How to Make Poison Pills Palatable, 
New York Times DealBook, July 17, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/how-to-make-poison-pills-
palatable/. 
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alternative to eminent domain in land assembly;39 Posner and Weyl incorporate it into a proposal 
for reforming Chapter 11;40 and Weyl suggests variants that might be plausible for committee or 
broader public decision-making even if an aversion to “money in politics” persists.41 
                                                
39 Scott Duke Kominers and E. Glen Weyl, Concordance among Holdouts; Extended Abstract (EC’11 Proceedings 
of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Sept 2012), online at 
http://www.scottkom.com/articles/Kominers_Weyl_Concordance_among_Holdouts.pdf (visited May 3, 2012). 
40 Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting Rules in Chapter 11: A Proposal for Reform, unpub. m.s. 2013. 
41 Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (cited in note 5). 
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Appendix A: Ex-Ante Shareholder Value and Ex-Post Decisions 
 
 QV is ex-post (Kaldor-Hicks) efficient in the sense that, at the moment of decision, it 
maximizes the prospective wealth of society.  The goal of a firm about to make an initial public 
offering, however, is not to maximize this ex-post efficiency but to minimize the cost of raising 
capital.  To compare these two we consider a simple model. 
 There are two stages.  At the first stage, a market for shares exists.  At the second stage, a 
decision is made.  There are 𝑁 individuals with a representative individual 𝑖 having utility 𝑢!!(𝑠!)− 𝑝𝑠! if she owns 𝑠! shares, the price of shares is 𝑝 and the decision in the second period 
is made in favor of the action and utility 𝑢!¬!(𝑠!)− 𝑝𝑠! if the decision is made not to implement 
the action.  Thus we assume, for simplicity and because any given corporate holding is likely a 
small fraction of any individual’s lifetime wealth, that utility is quasi-linear in money.  We also 
assume that 𝑢!!! ,𝑢!¬!! > 0 > 𝑢!!!! ,𝑢!¬!!!   so that individuals value shares but will want to 
purchase a finite number.   
Suppose that, independent of share purchases, the decision is made for 𝐴 with probability 𝜋.  Then if individuals evaluate prospects as maximizers of expected utility, individual 𝑖’s 
expected utility is 𝜋𝑢!! 𝑠! + 1− 𝜋 𝑢!¬! 𝑠! − 𝑝𝑠! .  If individuals can freely choose the number 
of shares they buy, then their first-order conditions are 𝜋𝑢!!!(𝑠!)   + 1− 𝜋 𝑢!¬!!𝑠! = 𝑝.  This 
must hold for all individuals 𝑖 and, because we denominate shares as a fraction of the total 
shares, they must sum to 1. 
Suppose that those running the initial IPO, who we will collectively refer to as “the 
entrepreneur”, wish to choose 𝜋 (or a rule for choosing 𝜋)  to maximize profits.  The implicit 
function theorem yields that  𝜋𝑢!!!! 𝑠! + (1− 𝜋)𝑢!¬!!! 𝑠! 𝑑𝑠!𝑑𝜋 + 𝑢!!! 𝑠! − 𝑢!¬!(𝑠!) = 𝑑𝑝𝑑𝜋 
for all 𝑖, assuming all individuals buy shares, and 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑑𝜋 = 0.  Thus, solving out, 𝑑𝑝𝑑𝜋 = 𝑠!𝜖!𝜖 𝑢!!! 𝑠! − 𝑢!¬! 𝑠! , 
where the price elasticity of share purchases, 𝜖! ≡ 𝑝𝑠![𝜋𝑢!!!! 𝑠! + 1− 𝜋 𝑢!¬!!! 𝑠! ] > 0 
for all 𝑖 by our assumptions and 𝜖 is the share-weighted average price elasticity of share 
purchases across individuals.  Thus the initial shareholders want to move toward whichever 
decision maximizes a weighted average across shareholders of their marginal utility for 
additional shares, where weights are proportional to the number of shares an individual owns 
multiplied by their elasticity of their share purchases with respect to price.  This is effectively a 
collective version of the classic Ramsey price discriminatory rule.  The problem is that, once 
shares have been sold, individuals’ interests are determined only by 𝑢!! 𝑠! − 𝑢!¬! 𝑠! , the level 
of their utility, not by their marginal utility for additional shares.  While these may be aligned 
under some assumptions, in general they will not be perfectly so.  For example, individuals 
might be happy to see a corporation reduce pollution, even at the cost of some profits per share, 
but this would not make them more willing to pay for the shares of the corporation.  In a more 
subtle but interesting example, a firm taking on a project that is risky but highly profitable might 
make shareholders better off, but actually less willing to pay for shares at the margin, depending 
on the nature of risk preferences. 
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 This fundamental problem stops QV, or any ex-post efficient mechanism, from 
maximizing ex-ante shareholder value.  However it is not just ex-post efficient mechanisms that 
will fail to maximize ex-ante shareholder value: an ex-post inefficient mechanism like voting is 
likely to do even worse as there is no reason at all that what is preferred by the majority of shares 
should align with efficiency.  For example if shareholders believe, as is possible under majority 
voting, that one or a few individuals will buy enough shares to vote for the inefficient 
expropriation of minority shareholders, the equilibrium price of votes will fall to zero as the 
marginal value of shares is 0 in the state when such an expropriation takes place.  More broadly, 
Jehiel and Moldovanu show that the only information that a mechanism can elicit from agents is 
that information that directly affects their payoffs from the action that the mechanism will 
determine.42  That is, any ex-post mechanism followed by free trading in shares (so that the 
mechanism cannot force agents to rearrange their share holdings) can never elicit complete 
information about which decision maximizes ex-ante shareholder value.  We believe that 
maximizing ex-post efficiency is likely to line up with ex-ante shareholder value more reliably 
under QV than under any other mechanism in a broader range of cases and that ex-post 
efficiency is desirable in itself.  However, there will no doubt be cases when ex-post inefficient 
actions might nonetheless promote ex-ante shareholder value. 
 Another argument we discuss in the text is that linking votes to shares might improve the 
share price.  To show why we are skeptical of this claim, imagine that 𝜋 is now a function of the 
number of shares each individual owns.  From the perspective of individual 𝑖, only the 
dependence of 𝜋 on her own shares is decision-relevant and thus we abuse notation slightly by 
writing 𝜋𝑠𝑖.  Individual 𝑖’s decision-relevant utility is then 𝜋 𝑠! 𝑢!! 𝑠! + [1− 𝜋 𝑠! ]𝑢!¬! 𝑠! −𝑝𝑠! .    Now individual 𝑖’s first-order condition is 𝜋𝑢!!! 𝑠! + 1− 𝜋 𝑢!¬!! 𝑠! + 𝜋! 𝑠! [𝑢!! 𝑠! − 𝑢!¬! 𝑠! ]   = 𝑝. 
 Thus selling influence over the decision can raise the price of shares to the extent that the 
most marginal influence is granted to those who gain the most (ex-post) by influencing the 
decision.  This seems to indicate that those who already have a lot of shares (and thus a lot at 
stake) should be offered the most influence in exchange for purchasing an additional share.  
However, three things are worth noting.   
First, there is no sense in which this component of the price is maximized by the one-
share-one-vote rule, or by any simple linking of votes to shares.  Thus the current system is 
hardly geared to raising maximal revenue off of votes. 
Second, a series of recent theorems by most notably Mailath and Postelwaite and most 
generally Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky imply that as 𝑁 grows large, so long as each 𝑠𝑖 becomes 
small (no one owns a large part of the firm), 𝜋′ must become small for all individuals 𝑖, so much 
so that the amount of revenue that can be raised in total is very small compared to the total value 
of the firm.43  Thus the revenue raised by linking voting to shares is likely to be very small 
compared to the value created by getting the decision “right”.  While again, the “right” decision 
from the perspective of ex-ante shareholder value need not be the ex-post efficient decision, this 
seems (as argued above) likelier than any other ex-post rule to maximize ex-ante shareholder 
value. 
                                                
42 Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations. 69 Econometrica 1237 
(2001). 
43 George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents, 57 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 351(1990); Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Rann Smorodinsky, Pivotal Players and the Characterization of 
Influence, 92 J. Econ. Theory 318 (2000). 
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Finally, note that the contribution to the price of the voting rights enters linearly into the 
equation.  Thus, especially given the logic above, it seems sensible to consider what voting 
system (separate from shares) would raise maximal revenue (even if this is very small, perhaps 
even irrelevant, by the previous discussion) and thus maximally raise the value of shares (based 
on distributing this revenue back to shareholders to raise their willingness-to-pay for shares).   
Weyl has considered this question in work that is not publicly available but is available 
on request.  He calibrates a model of preferences that depend on both income and an 
idiosyncratic component, where income follows the log-normal distribution with parameters 
approximating the income distribution in the United States and an idiosyncratic component to 
preferences that makes individuals on average willing to pay roughly !!""" of their annual income 
to make the decision go their way.  He considers vote-buying rules where the price of votes are 
proportional to 𝑣𝑥 where 𝑣 is the number of votes purchased.  𝑥 = 2 is QV, 𝑥 = 1 is linear vote 
buying (as occurs with shares) and 𝑥 =∞ is democracy.  The figure above shows revenues as a 
function of 𝑥.  The peak does not occur at 2, but slightly below.  However, 2 is very close to the 
peak and far above either the values of 1 or ∞.  Thus QV seems likely to raise at very least as 
much revenue from the allocation of votes as does share-linked voting, likely much more than 
that and close to the maximal revenue one could achieve by selling off votes to maximize 
revenue at least in plausible circumstances. 
 
 
Appendix B: QV’s Bias Against Small-Group Opportunism  
 
 The theoretical results Weyl (2013) establishes about QV depend on the assumption that 
every individual is “small” in the sense that he or she has independently and identically 
distributed preferences and there are a large number of individuals.  In corporate governance, on 
the other hand, there may be a single individual or a small group of individuals who have strong 
preferences potentially opposite to those of the large mass of the population.  For example, an 
outside raider or do-gooder, or the CEO, may seek to take an action that is against the interest of 
most (by numbers of people, not necessarily number of shares) shareholders.  Such opportunism, 
anticipated ex-ante, will lower the willingness of individuals to pay for shares and thus, by the 
logic of Appendix A, lower the profits.  In this appendix we show that such an attempt by a 
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single individual, which we label “opportunism”, is never advantageous.  The individual would 
always do better to make payments to the other shareholders such that the transaction is in the 
others’ interests rather than to attempt to vote in the opportunistic scheme themselves.  In this 
sense, QV is opportunism-proof.   
 We consider only the case when there is a single opportunistic individual.  The same 
argument could easily be extended so long as the size of the opportunistic group is small (of 
constant size even as the size of other voters/shareholders grows).  In particular, suppose that an 
individual proposes an opportunistic action 𝐴.  There is a large number of shareholders 𝑁 who 
have values drawn independently and identically from some distribution with negative mean 𝜇 
and variance 𝜎2 for action 𝐴 occurring; they thus typically are harmed by the opportunistic 
action.44  Let 𝑀𝑖 be the 𝑖th moment of the distribution of small individual valuations; we assume 
the first four moments of the distribution exist. The opportunist has a (for simplicity commonly 
known) utility 𝑈 > 0 from 𝐴 being undertaken.  For large 𝑁, 𝐴 is weakly efficient if and only if 𝑈 ≥ −𝑁𝜇 and inefficient otherwise.  To analyze this case we draw heavily on the techniques of 
Weyl (2013) without introducing them pedagogically here.  Those interested in following the 
argument more closely should first read at least Sections 1 and 2 of that paper. 
 Following the logic of Subsection 2.2, we approximate the votes purchased by any small 
individual with utility 𝑢 by 𝑣(𝑢) = 𝑎(𝑁)𝑢 + 𝑏 𝑁 𝑢!.  The mean of votes purchased by all small 
individuals together is then 𝑚 ≡ 𝑁𝑎 𝑁 𝜇 + 𝑁𝑏 𝑁 𝜇! + 𝜎!  and their variance 𝑠! ≡ 𝑁(𝑎! 𝑁 [𝜇! + 𝜎!]+ 𝑎 𝑁 𝑏 𝑁 [𝑀! − 𝜇(𝜇! + 𝜎!)]+ 𝑏!(𝑁)[𝑀! − 𝜇! + 𝜎! !]  ). 
The distribution of the sum of all 𝑁 small individuals votes is approximately normal with mean 𝑚 and variance 𝑠2, while the distribution of the sum of any 𝑁 − 1  individuals votes is 
approximately normal with mean !!!! 𝑚 and variance !!!! 𝑠!.   
 Let 𝑔 be the distribution of the sum of all 𝑁 small individual votes.  The 
opportunist will buy votes satisfying 𝑣!∗ = !(!!!∗)! 𝑈 ≈ !! !!∗!! !!!!!! !! 𝑈.  The distribution of votes by 
everyone else facing any small individual is approximately normal and has mean !!!! 𝑚 + 𝑣!∗ and 
variance !!!! 𝑠! because 𝑈 is common knowledge and thus 𝑣!∗ deterministic (or essentially 0 if 
the opportunist plays a mixed strategy).  Thus, by the logic of the proof of Lemma 2 in the 
Appendix of Weyl (2013),  𝑏(𝑁)𝑎(𝑁) = − 𝑁𝑁 − 1 𝑣!∗ +𝑚2𝑠!  
and 
 
𝑎 𝑁 = 𝑝(𝑁) 𝑁𝑒!
!!!!!!∗!! !! !!!!!!2𝑠 2𝜋(𝑁 − 1) , 
where 𝑝(𝑁) is the probability that the opportunist tries to buy the election if she is playing a 
mixed strategy (and 1 if she always tries). 
                                                
44 Note that the iid assumption is not important here as long as all individuals are small.  For example, if different 
individuals had different shares and these scaled up their values, but values were otherwise iid, as long as no 
individual had a large number of shares the analysis would proceed along precisely the same lines. 
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There are three cases to consider: that !!∗! heads towards 0 for large 𝑁, that as 𝑁 grows 
large, 𝑣!∗ grows in absolute value relative to 𝑚 without bound and that !!∗! converges to a constant.  
Let us consider these cases in order.  First, if !!∗! shrinks as 𝑁 grows large, clearly the opportunist 
wins with vanishing probability (given that 𝑠 shrinks relative to 𝑚 by the law of large numbers) 
as 𝑁 grows large, so our case is already proven.   
In the second case,  
𝑎 𝑁 → 𝑝(𝑁)𝑒! ! !!∗ !!(!!!)!!2𝑠 2𝜋 , 𝑏(𝑁)𝑎(𝑁) → − 𝑣!∗2𝑠!, 
and 𝑣!∗ → 𝑒! !!∗ !!!!2𝑠 2𝜋𝑈. 
Thus 
𝑚 → 𝑁𝑝 𝑁 𝑒! ! !!∗ !! !!! !!2𝑠 2𝜋 𝜇 − 𝑣!∗2𝑠! 𝜇! + 𝜎!  
and 𝑚𝑣!∗ → 𝑁𝑝 𝑁 𝑒!
!!∗ !! !!! !!𝑈 𝜇 − 𝑣!∗2𝑠! 𝜇! + 𝜎! . 
Clearly in order for our hypothesis that !!!∗ vanishes for large 𝑁 to be maintained either 𝑝 𝑁  
must vanish (in which case clearly there is no limiting chance of the opportunist’s victory) or !!∗ !! !!! !! must explode in 𝑁.  But 𝑠! ≥ 𝑁𝑎! 𝑁 𝜇! + 𝜎! → 𝑝! 𝑁 𝑁𝑒! ! !!∗ !!!! !!8𝑠!𝜋 ⇒ 𝑠 = 𝛺 𝑒! ! !!∗ !! !!! !!  
Thus 𝑣!∗ = 𝑂 𝑒!(!!!) !!∗ !! !!! !! .  But this implies that the number of votes purchased by the 
opportunist dies exponentially with 𝑁.  This clearly cannot be an equilibrium as any other 
shareholder would then pay to outvote the opportunist on her own.  It can be shown that there is 
no other equilibrium supported by such behavior for reasons tightly analogous to those in the 
constant !!∗! case to which we now turn. 
If !!∗! approaches a constant then again there are three subcases, though only one that is 
interesting. If !!∗! → 𝛾 < 1 then the probability of victory conditional on buying votes by the 
opportunist is less that !!, which is ruled out by the fact that, as shown in Subsection 2.3 of 
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Weyl,45 such a strategy will never be optimal for the opportunist.  If 𝛾 > 1 then a logic very 
similar to the one above in the case where !!∗! explodes shows this cannot be an equilibrium.  In 
the case where !!∗! → 1, we can index events by the finite value to which !!!!!!∗!!!  converges to; if 
the value is infinite then again the analysis resembles the case when !!∗!  explodes and is thus 
omitted.  Call the finite limiting value 𝛾.  Then 𝑎 𝑁 → 𝑝(𝑁) 𝑁𝑒!!!(!!!)!!2𝑠 2𝜋(𝑁 − 1)  
and  𝑠! ≥ 𝑁𝑎! 𝑁 𝜇! + 𝜎! → !! ! !!!!(!!!)!!!!!! ⇒ 𝑠 = 𝛺 𝑁! 𝑝(𝑁) . 
As above, if 𝑝 𝑁 → 0 as for large 𝑁, then we are done.  Suppose this is not the case.  Then 
because !(!)!(!) → 0 as 𝑁 grows large in this case by the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2 in 
Weyl (2013), it is also the case that 𝑠 = 𝑂 𝑁! .  Thus 𝑎 𝑁 = 𝛺 !!! .  Thus 𝑚 ≤ 𝑁𝑎 𝑁 𝜇 = 𝛺 𝜇𝑁!! . 
But !!∗! → 1 implies that 𝑣!∗ = 𝛺 𝜇𝑁!! .  Because the cost of votes is quadratic, this means the 
opportunist would have to be expending an amount on votes that is 𝛺 𝜇!𝑁!! .  Clearly this is 
only worthwhile if 𝑈 =   𝛺 𝜇!𝑁!!  as the best the opportunist can do is switch the decision’s 
outcome for sure at the cost of this many votes.  But given that the total utility of the small 
individuals is only of size 𝑁𝜇, as 𝑁𝜇 grows large this requires an unboundedly large amount of 
surplus to be generated by the opportunist’s desired course of action.  For example, suppose 
there are 10,000,000 shareholders and each has a disutility of $50 on average from the action 
taking place, as seems plausible for a major corporate decision.  They thus in aggregate have a 
disutility on average of $500 million of the action taking place.  Then the opportunist would 
have to have utility from the decision on the order of $80 trillion for an equilibrium where the 
opportunist wins with non-vanishing probability to prevail.  Clearly such an outcome is not a 
serious possibility for large decisions. 
 Thus, the only equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the one discussed in Subsection 2.3 
of Weyl.46  The opportunist, with probability 𝑝(𝑁) that vanishes with 𝑁, buys a substantial 
probability of winning the decision.  But now this probability is generated by a mixed strategy of 
the opportunist rather than the tail probabilities of the distribution of small individuals.  Note that 
this means that whenever the opportunist buys a substantial number of votes, she is indifferent 
between doing so and buying no votes at all.  Thus her expenditures must equal the fraction of 𝑈 
equal to the probability with which she, conditional on buying these shares, wins the vote.  Given 
that all of this revenue is distributed to individuals other than the opportunist, all individuals 
other than the opportunist will be weakly better off as a result of this purchase if and only if it is 
efficient for the opportunist to win. 
                                                
45 Weyl, supra note __. 
46 Weyl, supra note __. 
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 So clearly the opportunist has nothing to gain by trying to hijack the process in 
equilibrium when the transaction is large.  A much easier strategy is for the opportunist to adjust 
the offer to promise the other, small shareholders a utility, which is positive on average by 
paying them a fraction of 𝑈 contingent on approving the plan.  If 𝑈 > −𝑁𝜇 this is always 
feasible while still leaving positive surplus to the opportunist.  For example, the opportunist 
could promise to pay !!!"!  to the small shareholders if the transaction is approved, leaving him 
with surplus utility !!!"! .  Because QV is efficient for large 𝑁, this proposal will be approved 
(even if the opportunist buys no votes at all!) with probability 1 if there are many small 
shareholders.  This will yield the opportunist !!!"! , much better than the 0 she would earn trying 
to hijack the process.  Thus, at least with a large number of shareholders, an efficient opportunist 
maximizing utility will always choose to “payoff” small shareholders, thus making them better 
off, rather than trying to defeat them under QV.47 
 Intuitively the reason for this, reflected in the logic of the constant limiting !!∗! case above, 
is that the quadratic nature of the cost of votes makes it prohibitively expensive to stand alone 
against the world, even if the rest of the world has less total utility than you do.  It is cheaper 
simply to induce others to agree with you and allow them to, at much lower costs, vote in the 
proposal that benefits you.  Given that they are diffuse and cannot effectively bargain, it should 
be particularly easy for the opportunist to offer them the minimum amount necessary to ensure 
his victory so he can keep the maximum amount of surplus.  Small shareholders are still better 
off as a result of this, however.  Thus opportunism is not a concern under QV and the appraisal 
remedy is therefore unnecessary. 
 
 
 
                                                
47 Other strategies exist as well.  The opportunist could make such a deal with a subset of shareholders.    However, 
this is more expensive for the opportunist than is the other strategy because of the underdog effect (a demonstration 
is available on request).  Another strategy would be to offer side-payments to non-shareholders, or larger side-
payments to small than to large shareholders.  This could be effective by expanding the pool of those interested in 
voting in the opportunist’s interests.  However, such strategies could easily be ruled out as tantamount to fraudulent 
collusion/side-payments in the charter, just as other forms of fraud and collusion would have to face legal sanction.  
Individuals should be restricted from making side payments that are not divided evenly among shareholders per 
share. 
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